SCADA and ICS security have been focusing on addressing issues such as vulnerability discovery and intrusion detection within critical national infrastructure. Less attention has been paid to architectural solutions to the cyber security risks from an information assurance perspective. Security controls are not always traced back to the business requirements. This paper presents a holistic end-to-end view of the requirements, medium to high severity risks and proposes a generic security architectural pattern to address them. The architectural pattern is developed based on the Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture (SABSA) top two layers, contextual and conceptual, which are responsible for understanding the business requirements and development of a concept architecture and strategy. Moreover, this research is motivated by industrial practices and has reflected the recent changes of GCHQ's mission. This research Copyright © 201X Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. 2 also contributes to the SCADA/ICS risk assessment by deriving holistic sets of risk management and architectural design requirements for SCADA/ICS.
Introduction

Background
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have been at the forefront of the news in recent years, in particular, the event at Iranian nuclear enrichment facility in 2010 [1] , the Stuxnet malware caused enrichment centrifuges. It provided false healthy status to the control centre computers. According to a 2013 survey [2] of nearly 700 participants conducted by the SANS institute, attack vectors of most concern against SCADA and ICS services include internal threat actors, advanced zeroday malware (i.e. Stuxnet or Flame) and external threats from hacktivists, terrorists or governments. Nearly 70% of responses indicated the threat to be high or severe in nature.
The top three primary drivers in relation to security with SCADA and ICS systems listed are control system service interruption prevention, damage prevention and information leakage prevention. The participants roles include average business user, auditor, IT director and manager, network administrator, security analyst, security manager, and others, among which security analyst accounts for 51%.
In recent years, there has been many studies conducted and papers written covering various aspects of SCADA and ICS security [3, 21, 22, 23, 24, 29, 30, 31, 32] . Studies relating to security risk management include the application of the attack tree [25, 26] and diagrammatic risk modeling approach [27] . Extant work also provides control system security standards, guidelines and best practices providing guidance on security risk management. These include IEC/ISA-62443 [4] , the internationally recognised industrial control system security standard, NIST SP 800-82 [5] , a cross-industry guidance for establishing secure industrial control systems (ICS), the UK's CPNI [6] , a good practice guide for ICS security and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's [7] guidance on the enhancement of ICS security. NIST SP 800-82 does an excellent job of providing best practice guidance for each of the various aspects of securing ICS/SCADA networks, however, it does not take a holistic business view and allow business requirements to be used to drive the controls. Moreover, there is a lot of information to get through before the reader can start to pull together a viable conceptual solution. There is a need of a generic architectural pattern that develops a target architecture based on a set of documented requirements, threats and risks, which can be adapted to suit. The UK's CPNI is a useful document but does not develop an architecture from the business requirements down. Businesses are in need of seeing that architectures are in support of the business requirements and by showing transparently they are through the use of attribute profiling that makes it transparent to auditing and review.
Motivation
Fernandez et al. [9] proposed methods to build a secure SCADA system using security patterns. They studied SCADA system from a high level looking at components such as vulnerabilities with physical access to the SCADA system and countering it by applying a Role Based Access Control (RBAC) process. This work was more aligned with conceptual architectural design than as a pattern for secure implementation of SCADA/ICS systems, which would benefit security practitioners and system architects. Gobena et al. [10] devised a new wide area network communications mechanism for connecting SCADA and ICS services to ensure availability. However, the focus was not on the confidentiality or integrity of system messaging in any more detail. Wu et al. [11] focused on the implementation of controls to capture, analyse and report breaches of security with regards to SCADA and ICS based systems and services for the forensic investigation and ultimate recovery and prosecution of the threat actors where possible. The paper explains the different types of attack and proposes a detailed forensics process. Zhendong et al. [12] provided the most detailed approach towards an architectural implementation, however, as with previous research, this was not of a sufficient level to provide a practitioner with the necessary level of decomposition such that they could design and implement secure industrial systems and services. In sum, despite these works being focused on architectural reference and design, the majority were at too high a level for the security practitioner to use to implement a secure SCADA and ICS service without significant further decomposition.
This research is also motivated by industrial practices. Due to changes within Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)'s mission directive, whereby the scope of CLAS will be expanded to support the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) with Information Assurance related matters, as well as the lack of advice for architects with regards to securing SCADA and ICS based systems, this research has been undertaken to provide a security architectural pattern to bridge the gap between CNI and IA, hence address SCADA/ICS systems risks.
The proposed security architectural pattern
However to date, very little documentation has been developed that provides an information assurance (IA) practitioners a holistic explanation of what the actual risks are and how to mitigate them. This paper presents a number of medium to high severity risks and proposes a security architectural pattern to address them. The architectural pattern is designed based on the Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture (SABSA), which has been widely used to design business security frameworks [17, 18, 19, 20] . SABSA is selected because it is a robust and internationally recognised architecture methodology which focuses on the business requirements and develops from there. It has been used over other methodologies because of its business focus and ability to trace controls back to these requirements [8] . It helps removing the risk of developing technical architectures in isolation of what the business needs. In this paper, the architectural pattern is delivered based on the SABSA's top two layers, namely contextual and conceptual, which are responsible for understanding the business requirements and development of a concept architecture and strategy [8] . The concept architecture can then be taken forward by the IA practitioners and adjusted to satisfy the needs of their own organisations.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the current architectural patterns for implementation of secure SCADA and ICS services. Section 3 presents a number of medium to high severity risks, whilst Section 4 presents the proposed security architectural pattern and Section 5 discusses the proposed security architectural pattern. Section 6 summarises the paper and lays the foundations for future work.
ICS Infrastructure
Traditional SCADA/ICS systems were composed of isolated networks without connection to others (e.g. corporate networks and the Internet) [13] . Most did not have the security risks we know today and subsequently were flat networks with very little control implemented. Based on CPNI documentation [14] , Figure 1 summarises a typical SCADA and ICS network implementation today, which has evolved to become integrated with the corporate network as well as there having been the introduction of remote access and support capabilities with remote sites and third parties.
Risk Management
Threat Assessment
The Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) is subject to a number of threat sources, which are detailed below along with their representative scores regarding the threat level of them It is clear from the threat assessment that there are a number of highly capable threat sources, which could have a vested interested in causing significant impact to the UK's national infrastructure. The type and level of security controls that need to be put in place to minimise risk from them needs to provide a significant defence in depth capability. Table 2 provides a high level risk assessment and treatment plan of a typical SCADA and ICS implementation based on SCADA and ICS deployment in section 2. Threat sources have only been shown where their risk has been assessed as medium or higher. The treatment (control) are to be applied to the previously identified risks to reduce them to an acceptable level. This is based on a qualitative approach, following the international standards organisation (ISO) 27005:2011 methodology [33] . As mentioned above, the architectural pattern is delivered based on the SABSA security architecture framework's top two layers, namely, contextual and conceptual, which are responsible for understanding the business requirements and development of a concept architecture and strategy. The concept architecture can then be taken forward by the IA practitioner and made more relevant to his or her organisation and constraints. The pattern is delivered by starting with business requirements engineering, defining architectural principles for the design and finally developing the conceptual design itself with detailed information on the technical, governance and assurance controls implemented. The pattern also provides advice and guidance at managing legacy installations.
Risk Assessment and Treatment
The Focus of Contextual & Conceptual Layers in SABSA
The contextual layer of the SABSA framework is concerned with identification of the business requirements (BR) and the development of security focused business drivers (BD), which will support the business requirements and drive the security architecture. Business Requirements (BRs) are obtained from the stakeholders and will be in the language of business. They will not specifically be security focused and nor will they be in the language a security professional may be familiar with. Business Drivers (BDs) are defined in the language of security to deliver, support and enable one or more of the BRs. A typical example of this could be that the Chief Operating Officer (COO) is "concerned that the ICS network must be up and running 100% of the time, any down time will have a financial impact on the organisation". This is a business requirement (from the COO). A BD to support/enable this would be "The availability of the ICS network must be maintained at 100% service". The conceptual layer of this framework is concerned with normalisation of the business drivers (BD) into attributes 1 and development of the conceptual design. Figure 2 illustrates this process in diagrammatic form. This pattern is designed to provide an overall holistic approach to delivering a secure architecture for SCADA and ICS based infrastructure. It is conceptual in nature, which means it is not intended to be a definitive architectural design for immediate implementation, but more a guidance design with services architected in line with best practice, up to date risk assessment as well as some degree of future proofing based on current and future trends ascertained from previous research.
Business Requirements
The business requirements will change depending on sector, regulatory demands, business and financial constraints etc. Table 3 details typical business requirements for a CNI provider as a generic starting point. SCADA and ICS systems work 24/7/365. Downtime refers to the business stopping, which can result in a financial impact as well as fines in some regulated industries, if the period of this time is above agreed limits. Therefore the main business focus is the availability of the SCADA and ICS systems. The service must maintain maximum up time and prevent control system disruption. BR2
The service must be supportable remotely.
BR3
The SCADA system must be accessible by the corporate network for data exchange.
BR4
The service must be accessed by authorised staff only.
BR5
The service must be allowed to utilise connectivity across public networks, such as the Internet.
BR6
The service must have internal auditing and monitoring to identify system misuse or attack.
BR7
The service must deter threat sources identified as having a high likelihood of attack.
BR8
The service must deter internal threat actors (threat source TS1).
BR9
Prevent damage to the industrial systems and the ICS controls. BR10 Prevent information leakage.
Business Drivers
Business requirements (BR) are high level requirements defined by the business stakeholders and as such can be complex, such as "deliver a secure ICT network". So to be more specific, manageable, traceable and security focused business drivers (BD) are developed to support one or more BRs, thereby allowing complex requirements to be broken down and hence, managed more easily. 
Attribute Profiling
An attribute is defined [16] as a conceptual abstraction of a real business requirement (the goals, objectives, drivers and targets), which is modelled into a normalised language that articulates requirements and measures performance in a way that is instinctive to all stakeholders. Table 5 provides an attribute profile based on the BDs along with the standard definition from SABSA [16] . Authenticated Every party claiming a unique identity (i.e. a claimant) should be subject to a procedure that verifies that the party is indeed the authentic owner of the claimed identity. Authorized
The system should allow only those actions that have been explicitly authorised. Access Controlled Access to information and functions within the system should be controlled in accordance with the authorized privileges of the party requesting the access. Unauthorised access should be prevented BD2 Monitored The operational performance of the system should be continuously monitored to ensure that other attribute specifications are being met. Any deviations from acceptable limits should be notified to the systems management function.
Auditable
The actions of all parties having authorised access to the system, and the complete chain of events and outcomes resulting from these actions should be recorded so that this history can be reviewed. The audit records should provide an appropriate level of detail, in accordance with business needs. BD3 Interoperable The system should interoperate with other similar systems, both immediately and in future as intersystem communication becomes increasingly a requirement.
Access Controlled
Access to information and functions within the system should be controlled in accordance with the authorized privileges of the party requesting the access and unauthorised access should be prevented.
Monitored
The operational performance of the system should be continuously monitored to ensure that other attribute specifications are being met and any deviations from acceptable limits should be notified to the systems management function.
BD4
Cost Effective The design, acquisition, implementation, and operation of the system should be achieved at a cost that the business finds acceptable when judged against the benefits. Access Controlled Access to information and functions within the system should be controlled in accordance with the authorized privileges of the party requesting the access and unauthorised access should be prevented.
Monitored
BD5
Interoperable The system should interoperate with other similar systems, both immediately and in future as intersystem communication becomes increasingly a requirement. Access Controlled Access to information and functions within the system should be controlled in accordance with the authorized privileges of the party requesting the access and unauthorised access should be prevented. BD6 Detectable Important events must be detected and reported. The operational performance of the system should be continuously monitored to ensure that other attribute specifications are being met and any deviations from acceptable limits should be notified to the systems management function. Auditable
The actions of all parties having authorised access to the system, and the complete chain of events and outcomes resulting from these actions should be recorded so that this history can be reviewed. The audit records should provide an appropriate level of detail, in accordance with business needs.
Access Controlled
BD7
Architecturally Open The system architecture should, wherever possible, not be locked into specific vendor interface standards and should allow flexibility in the choice of vendors and products, both initially and in the future. BD8 Available The information and services provided by the system should be available according to the requirements specified in the service-level agreement (SLA). BD9 Detectable Important events must be detected and reported. Monitored
Auditable
The actions of all parties having authorised access to the system, and the complete chain of events and outcomes resulting from these actions should be recorded so that this history can be reviewed. The audit records should provide an appropriate level of detail, in accordance with business needs. Access Controlled Access to information and functions within the system should be controlled in accordance with the authorized privileges of the party requesting the access and unauthorised access should be prevented.
Design
The design phase is split between architectural principles, which define the underlying general rules and guidelines for the design, and the design itself.
Architectural principles
There are two key architectural principles to ensure the service is delivered against the business requirements, which are tiered architecture and the defence-in-depth model. A tiered architecture allows for types of services (i.e. web/application services which present front end applications to users) to be collectively located within logical or physical domains where a security policy can be applied. A three-tiered architecture is typical of an infrastructure whereby end users and third parties will access the network through an access layer. This will be responsible for securing the user connectivity to the network either directly, i.e. switch port security, or indirectly, i.e. over remote access or virtual private networks (VPN). The presentation layer is responsible for locating the application services, user authentication to the applications, applying role based access control (RBAC), providing authorised views of data as well as auditing user activity within the application(s). The data layer is located in the heart of the network and connectivity is restricted to the authorised applications that need to access the database or data repository. Communication in this layer is usually restricted to application traffic using database commands, such as SQL.
Each layer is segregated from the others via firewalls, which are configured to allow only approved protocols and services through as strictly as possible. Figure 3 below shows a diagrammatic representation of a three-tiered architecture model. The second is to deliver defence in depth [16] by layering security controls so as to reduce the risk to the assets being protected. As can be seen in Figure 4 , by applying multiple controls "on top of" the information asset (in this case the SCADA and ICS configuration and management data) the architect introduces further barriers, which a threat actor has to overcome. For the more competent threat actors this will slow them down within the time it takes to get through some of the controls, the protective monitoring service should have alerted someone to the attack, which will allow further action to be taken (such as dropping the threat actors connection).
Figure 4 Defence in depth model
Defence in depth ensures there is no single point of failure from threats to assets by providing differing barriers (controls) in a layered approach. By applying the industry standard 80/20 rule (80% effectiveness of a control) to each control, you decrease the likelihood of a compromise exponentially as another control is layered on, as can be seen in Figure 5 below. 
Conceptual design
In line with the business drivers, risk assessment and architectural principles above, Figure  6 describes the conceptual target architecture for delivering SCADA and ICS based services in a risk managed way. SABSA attributes have been added where relevant to the services to ensure appropriate controls are included during any revision of the design by the reader. 
Components of the Architectural Pattern
This section provides more details about the control components within the target architecture. By applying the layering architectural principle, the three core components of the overall solution are split up into their own security domains and placed neatly in their representative layers, as follows.
Access layer
Access layer provides the first line of defence with connectivity to and from the "corporate network" as well as remote systems and support along with third party support,
• Data exchange between the corporate network and the SCADA/ICS network systems should be inspected for data schema validation and content inspection to ensure malicious packets are not injected into the SCADA/ICS network from the corporate network.
• Third party support should be configured to allow only the minimum system connectivity and access required as defined in a corporate third party security policy.
• Intrusion detection/prevention services monitor network communications from lower trust networks, such as the corporate network and remote/third party access networks.
• Remote access is managed through a dedicated RAS/VPN service, which, depending on make/model, can be configured to provide network access control (NAC) capability to ensure remote endpoints meet a minimum level of technical security (i.e. security patches are up to date, AV signature definition is within acceptable delta etc.).
Presentation layer
Presentation layer delivers the application functionality and formats the information for further processing or display,
• RBAC configured within the applications to ensure users meet the principle of "least privilege" for their role(s).
• Segregation of security domains is achieved through layer 3 stateful firewalls.
• Application servers should have a host based IPS software agent installed to minimise risk to the host and application through attacks such as buffer overflows or malicious commands (i.e. SQL injection).
Data layer
Data Layer provides security for the backend databases and repositories,
• Consideration should be given to encrypting sensitive databases.
• Data read/write should only be possible from authorised accounts associated with the SCADA and ICS application(s). Table 6 provides a list of the component security controls from the target architecture to form the basis of a bill of materials (BoM).
Traceability
A good architecture will start with the business requirements (BR), derive security focused business drivers (BDs) to support these and develop the necessary design to support the BDs. According to Palmer [28] , "traceability provides support in understanding the relationships that across architectural requirements, design and implementation". Table 7 shows traceability mapping among business drivers, attributes and controls. Access layer
Content Gateway
Provide schema and data validation checks on exported (and imported) data to (and from) the corporate network.
Access layer
For sensitive data, it would be advised also to implement data loss prevention (DLP) technology on the gateway to restrict exfiltration of data which should not leave the environment. Host IPS Analyse OS and application processes to prevent attacks such as buffer overflows or malicious code injection.
Presentation layer
System Hardening Best practice guidance to secure devices, OS and applications to reduce security footprint.
All layers RBAC Provide role based access control to staff to enforce minimum privilege levels for their role.
All layers
Anti-malware (not shown in diagram)
Installed on all systems where files can be exchanged and/or media (CD/DVD/USB keys etc.) can be installed. 
All layers
Discussion
This pattern has achieved what it set out to do in a structured manner in that it has, firstly, identified current risks with SCADA and ICS systems, it then derived a typical set of business requirements for using industrial control technology, through a globally recognised security architecture framework, SABSA. For this research, a conceptual target architecture was developed, which can provide the basis for organisations to build their own target architecture. As the pattern is based on the principle of a tiered architecture, extensibility is made easier by introducing components into the correct tier and managing connectivity between tiers through the corresponding security controls. The architectural pattern can be used to develop a future state architecture to drive the legacy platform towards through business change. Rather than the SCADA and ICS systems themselves, this pattern focuses on architecture of the infrastructure they operate within. SCADA and ICS systems connected directly by public connectivity are still common today and they allow for low capability threat actors to gain access. Simple "best practice" will reduce the overall risk and remove the low to medium capability threat actors from the equation. With the premise that no security is 100%, preventing the high capability threat actors is not possible. By following the defence in depth principle, the IA practitioner can slow their activities down through the barriers (controls) and with a good level of system auditing and anomaly detection within the protective monitoring service, the security team can be alerted in real time to any suspect or actual incident, thereby being able to take any action deemed necessary in a timely manner.
Conclusion and Future Work
SCADA and ICS security have attracted people's attention and there have been plenty of studies covering many aspects of these systems. Although a lot of information exists in various forms and formats on designing secure industrial control systems and networks, very little documentation has been developed to document a holistic view of SCADA/ICS system risks and to guide IA practitioners on how to mitigate these risks. This paper brings all that information together and providing a generic architectural pattern and holistic end to end view of the requirements, risks assessments and mitigations.
We have identified current risks with SCADA and ICS systems and proposes a security architectural pattern to address them. The newly developed architectural pattern is based on two layers of the SABSA framework, contextual and conceptual, which are responsible for understanding the business requirements and development of a concept architecture and strategy. The use of the SABSA framework allows the organisations to focus on their business and trace controls back to these requirements, removing the risk of developing technical architectures in isolation of the business needs. The deliverables include holistic sets of ICS/SCADA threat sources, risk assessment and treatment controls, typical sets of business requirements, business drivers, attributes and architectural design.
Extant research has provided rich security risk management and control methods. However, it has not clearly distinguished those that are suitable for SCADA/ICS. This research has addressed this issue by deriving holistic sets of risk management and architectural design requirements for SCADA/ICS. In addition, this research is motivated by industrial needs. The integration of industrial practices allows the framework to be more practical and suitable to guide IA practitioners in real practice.
A initial testing of the pattern has been shown through the risk assessment and risk treatment plan with the identified risk mitigation controls in the conceptual design. Future work should conduct more explicit testing such as the pattern implementation as part of an architectural engagement with a CNI service provider or in a virtualised environment subjecting to penetration testing.
